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Abstract
     In promoting well-being for women and female-headed households, social policy
analysts are increasingly attending to wealth accumulation rather than focusing solely on
income.  Homeownership equity is a form of wealth that may be especially helpful for
low-income women.  This paper analyzes 1992 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data for
the city and county of St. Louis.  Our primary hypothesis was that women, controlling for
marital status, income, and race, would be more likely to be denied home loans.  The
findings from this data set contradict our hypothesis and suggest that men are slightly
more likely than women to be denied mortgage loans.  Discussion centers around reasons
for this counter-intuitive finding and calls for more research on these matters.
1     Poverty rates among female headed households have dramatically increased in the last
twenty years (Abramovitz, 1988), prompting scholars to grow concerned about the
resulting impacts on women and children.  While attention has focused on female
disadvantage in income and labor markets, in recent years it has become clear that women
are also less likely than men to accrue wealth (Swigonski, 1996, Smith, 1990).  This
wealth disparity has equally serious implications, for as wealth inequities widen, female
headed households experience greater economic, social and psychological deprivations.
However, relatively few studies explore the mechanisms that account for gendered wealth
inequities.  This study attempts to do so by exploring differences in mortgage denial rates
between male and female applicants.
     Section one reviews studies of the economic, social and psychological impacts of
homeowning, and concludes that inequities in homeownership rates are detrimental for
female-headed households.  Section two reviews studies of mortgage lending
discrimination, and points to the fact that gender has been overlooked, perhaps due to the
glaring problem of racial bias in lending.  Section three explains the research questions,
data set, variables and research methods.  Section four is a presentation of findings.  The
paper concludes with implications for further research.
       I. Benefits of Homeownership
     While income poverty is recognized as a causal factor in an array of social problems,
wealth inequity is less so.  Sherraden (1991) suggests that American social policy has
overemphasized income and consumption while neglecting wealth accumulation.
Arguing that people usually do not spend their way out of poverty, Sherraden suggests
that poor households would benefit from policy that allowed and fostered the
2accumulation of assets through savings, business development and homeownership.
Savings, stored wealth--assets--are necessary for the kind of cushioning and security
needed to exit poverty. An asset based welfare policy, in this sense, would be superior to
anti-poverty policy based solely on income.
     Further, Sherraden suggests that there are additional benefits to asset accumulation.
He suggests that asset accumulation alters the thinking and behaviors of the poor,
allowing them to experience the world in new ways.  The result is a different approach to
the world that may result in a virtuous cycle in which asset accumulation and positive
behaviors reinforce one another.  The behavioral effects of asset accumulation he
suggests include: greater future orientation, development of other assets, increased
personal efficacy, and increased community and political participation.
     Theoretical and empirical studies suggest that homeownership may be a specific asset
which provides social, psychological and economic benefits to individuals and
households.  Homeownership appears to confer social status (Rakoff, 1977; Perin, 1977)
wealth accumulation (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Gyourko & Linneman, 1993), enhanced
life satisfaction (Rohe & Stegman, 1994a), increased neighboring and community
involvement (Rossi & Weber, 1996; Rohe & Stegman, 1994b), decreased residential
mobility (Rohe & Stewart, 1996), improved mental and physical health (Rossi & Weber,
1996; Page-Adams & Vosler, 1995) and increased well-being of off-spring (Green &
White, 1994).  While some studies do not support these effects, or support them only
weakly, a growing empirical literature suggests that homeowners enjoy benefits from
their tenure status.
3     Studies of  homeownership relevant to women demonstrate similar effects.  Peterson
(1980) and Page-Adams (1995) find that for white couples, homeownership (rather than
income) is negatively related to marital violence.  Cheng (1995), in an analysis of
National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) data, reports that homeownership
among female headed households reduces likelihood of poverty in adulthood for the
following generation.
      Thus, it is important to know if women are discriminated against in mortgage
markets, because such discrimination may widen economic and social inequalities
between men and women, and between single and married heads of household.
II. Mortgage Lending and Discrimination
     Recent census data suggest that inequalities do exist in terms of tenure status.  Overall,
65% of all households in 1995 owned their homes.  Among married couple households,
79% were homeowners, while 55% of households headed by men without wives did so.
Only 45% of households headed by women without husbands owned their homes (US
Bureau of the Census, 1995).  This suggests that single female headed households are less
likely to benefit from homeownership’s economic and social benefits.  Since we know
that mortgage markets have acted in discriminatory ways against racial and ethnic
minorities, it makes sense to assess whether this tenure differential between men and
women might also be a result of mortgage market discrimination.
4Historical Relationship of Race and Mortgage Lending
When Congress, in the 1970s, turned its attention to equal credit opportunity in
housing and consumer finance, there was much evidence that minorities and minority
neighborhoods were discriminated against in a dual housing finance market.  Minorities
often lacked access to conventional home mortgage credit.  Studies conducted by the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board indicated the
“strong probability of race discrimination in mortgage credit”. Later studies using data
from the mid-1970s confirmed that race was a statistically significant factor in the
conventional mortgage markets of many urban areas (Shear & Yezer, 1985; Schafer &
Ladd, 1981).
In 1974 the Equal Opportunity Credit Act was signed into law and later amended
to prohibit lending discrimination, including mortgage lending, on basis of race, color,
national origin, age, sex, marital status, religion, receipt of public assistance, or exercise
of rights granted by consumer protection statutes.  Two particularly important pieces of
legislation regarding fair lending have been the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
passed in 1975 and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) passed in 1977.  While the
Fair Housing Act and the Equal Opportunity Credit Act have addressed the general issue
of access to housing and credit, HMDA and CRA (as administered) have dealt more
directly with mortgage credit.  HMDA and CRA were passed to address the perceived
problems of housing credit not flowing properly to all neighborhoods within communities
at large, and in particular, the failure of some mortgage lenders to adequately serve all
segments of their primary trade areas (Hunter & Walker, 1995).
5HMDA requires most depository institutions to publicly disclose the number and
dollar volume of home mortgage loans they make in metropolitan areas by census tract.
The CRA requires federally regulated financial institutions to continuously and
affirmatively assess and be responsive to the credit needs of their entire service areas
(which they must identify on a map using specific, identifiable geographic boundaries)
including low-and moderate-income neighborhoods (Squires & O’Connor, 1993).
Empirical Studies
Discrimination in mortgage lending has been a leading issue of discussion in
academic and housing policy arenas for a long time.  There has been an ever increasing
number of studies regarding credit availability problems in inner cities. Questions related
to the issue of redlining (the practice whereby lenders refuse to make mortgage loans in
geographic areas characterized by heavy concentration of racial or ethic minorities
regardless of the creditworthiness of the loan applicants) have been examined.  A study of
lending patterns indicated a general lack of conventional lending in inner cities, especially
in racially changing areas (Dane, 1989).
Racial disparities in mortgage lending have been documented in numerous
studies, even after controlling for such factors as family income and wealth, age and
condition of  property, neighborhood turnover and other economic considerations (Toledo
Fair Housing Center, 1986;  Woodstock Institute, 1986; Squires & Velez, 1987; Shlay,
1988; Galster, 1991; Glabere, 1992).  After controlling for several variables associated
with the financial capacity of borrowers and physical conditions of housing, other studies
have found a statistically significant relationship between racial composition of
neighborhoods and race of applicants with the number and dollar amount of mortgage
6lending (Bradbury, Case, & Dunham, 1989; Shlay, 1989; Munnell, Browne, McEneaney,
& Tootell, 1992).  However, as noted by Benston (1981), many studies of redlining have
been inadequate since they have failed to control sufficiently for borrower characteristics
(see also Benston & Horsky, 1992).  In addition, as noted by Holmes & Horvitz (1994),
many studies do not adequately control for the risk differences across different geographic
areas.  When controlling for borrower characteristics and neighborhood risk, more recent
studies of redlining have produced mixed results.  Holmes and Horvitz (1994), in their
study of redlining in Houston, Texas, fail to find clear evidence of the practice, while the
paper by Canner, Gabriel, & Woolley (1991) examining nationwide data finds more
evidence of it.
Beginning in 1990, lenders were required by HMDA to publicly report the gender,
income, and race of loan applicants as well as the action taken on each loan (accepted,
denied, or withdrawn by the applicant).  The 1990 HMDA data indicated that mortgage
applicants from black and Hispanic households were systematically denied mortgage
loans at a higher rate than applicants from white households with similar incomes.
HMDA data released since 1991 have shown essentially the same disparate rejection rate.
This information has generated much public attention and concern.  However, housing
industry groups and some individuals in government and academia have argues that it
would be inappropriate to draw the conclusion from HMDA data that mortgage lenders
actively discriminate against minorities.  This is because the HMDA data do not take into
account information crucial to credit decisions, such as the loan applicant’s credit history,
other debts, and employment history (Hunter & Walker, 1995).  Partly in response to this
debate, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conducted a study of mortgage denial rates in
7the Boston metropolitan area (Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell, 1992) using a
much wider range of loan application data.  When taking account of the personal
characteristics of the borrowers, the Boston study reduced the magnitude of discrepancy
for Black and Hispanic applicants from 2.7 times the white denial rate to 1.6 times.  Thus,
controlling for differences in loan applicant wealth and credit history decreased race-
related differences in mortgage denial rates, but it did not eliminate them and the impact
of race remained statistically significant.
 Utilizing the same HMDA data as the Boston study, Hunter and Walker, in their
Cultural Affinity study (1995), chose to examine whether loan officers perceive such
objective information as credit history or reputation and financial leverage differently for
minority applicants than for white applicants.  The empirical results suggest that lenders
do treat objective loan application information differently, depending on the race of the
applicant.
Of all the studies cited in this paper, only the latter two (the Boston study and the
Cultural Affinity study) analyzed the influence of gender on home mortgage lending
decisions.  In both studies gender was found not to be statistically significant.
8III. Description of the Study
Research Questions
     Feminist scholars note that women are less likely to control economic resources than
are men (Bergman, 1986; Page-Adams, 1995; Spalter-Roth, 1983).  This occurs through
women’s disadvantaged position in the labor force (Bergman, 1986; Tomaskovic-Devey,
1993) and limited access to credit (Brush, 1992; Keeley, 1990).  Within households,
women may also have less control over economic resources and decision making
(Lundberg & Pollak, 1993). This perspective led us to predict that women, like racial
minorities, may be more likely to be denied home loans than men. Thus, our research
questions were: 1) Are women more likely than men to be denied home mortgage loans?
And if so, 2)  Are women more likely than men to be denied home mortgage loans when
controlling for race, income, and marital status?  In pursuing these questions it was
hypothesized that poor, single, minority women would be most likely to be denied home
mortgage loans.
The Data Set
     This study uses 1992 mortgage application data collected under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act for the St. Louis Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.   The data set
included only census tracts for St. Louis City and County area.  A total of 21,874 cases
were in the original data set.  After deleting cases missing both applicant gender and race
information, the sample size was reduced to 16,249.  (Information was sometimes
missing due to HMDA regulations which allow banks not to report full information on
portfolio loans.)
9Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable:
The dependent variable in this study was a dichotomous variable, defined as
whether or not an applicant was denied approval of an owner occupied home mortgage.
In our sample (N=16249) 88% of loan applicants were granted mortgage loans, while
12% were denied.  On the basis of gender, 14% of women who applied were denied,
whereas 11% of men were denied.
Independent Variables:
Of primary interest in this study was the examination of denial patterns by
applicant gender.  In our sample 21% of applicants were women and 79% were men.  In
addition to gender, a number of independent variables were used to assess denial rates:
Loan Amount.  The amount for which applicants applied ranged from $3,000 to
$1,100,000.  One case was deemed an extreme outlier and was truncated at $1,100,001.
Mean and median loan amounts were $92,000 and $75,000 respectively (std.=69,000).
On average women applied for smaller loans at an average loan amount of $65,000 and
median of $58,000.  Men applied for loans on average of $98,000 and a median of
$81,000.
Applicant Income.  This variable reflects the annual income of applicants.  Missing values
(n=269) were set at the median income level of $43,000.  Reported applicant incomes
ranged from $1,000 to $1,000,000.  Seven cases were deemed extreme outliers and were
truncated at $1,000,001.  Mean and median applicant incomes were $55,000 and $43,000
respectively (std.=57,000).  Women’s mean and median incomes were $36,000 and
$30,000 respectively, while men’s mean and median income were $61,000 and $48,000
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respectively.  In order to assess denial patterns by income group, the income variable was
categorized into 4 levels--those earning $60,000 and above, those earning $40,000-
$60,000, those earning $20,000-$40,000 and those earning $20,000 or less.
Applicant Race.  The race variable was categorized dichotomously into White and
Black/Hispanic applicants.  71% of applicants were White men, 16% White women, 8%
Black/Hispanic men, and 5% Black/Hispanic women.
Co-applicant.  This variable was dichotomous indicating whether or not an applicant had
a co-applicant.  66% reported having co-applicants whereas 34% did not have co-
applicants.  78% of men had co-applicants and 17% of women had co-applicants.  This
variable was used as a proxy for marital status.
IV. Results
Bivariate Analysis
Bivariate correlations between the independent variables are presented in
Appendix A.  While there are significant associations between all independent variables,
an analysis of coefficients demonstrates no major multicollinearity problems.
Logistic Regression
     Our preliminary step was to execute a logistic regression using only applicant sex as a
predictor of denial rates.  As show in Table 1 the analysis demonstrates a good fit
between the model and the data (x2=12.255; df=1; p<.001).  Women have 1.22 the odds
of men for mortgage loan denial.
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Table 1
Model 1:  Denial by Gender
Variable                  b                                       Wald Chi-square           Odds Ratio      Confidence Limits
Gender                     .2018                                12.5810*                           1.22                  1.09 - 1.37
N=16,249
Model Chi-square:  12.255, df=1, p=.0001
*p<.05
     In order to test for the impact of control variables on denial rates, we ran two
subsequent models.  In the first, we added the race variable.  As shown in Table 2 the
analysis demonstrates a good fit between the model and the data (x2=443.211; df=2;
p<.001). Addition of the race variable, however, moves gender out of significance.  The
odds of Blacks and Hispanics is 3.6 the odds of whites for loan denial.
Table 2
Model 2:  Denial by Gender and Race
Variable                  b                                       Wald Chi-square           Odds Ratio     Confidence Limits
Gender                     -.0014                                   .0005                             .999                  .89 - 1.12
Race                        1.2680                             480.8634*                         3.554                3.17 - 3.98
N=16,249
Model Chi-square:  443.211, df=2, p=.0001
*p<.05
     Next we executed a more fully specified model of loan denial testing the effects of
gender controlling for race, income, and marital status.  Again, the analysis indicates that
the model has a good fit with the data (x2=692.319; df=4; p<.001).  As shown in Table 3
all of the variables have significant associations with loan denial.  Race and income are
positively associated with denial in the model.  This indicates that  racial minorities are
more likely than whites and poorer applicants more likely than wealthier applicants to be
denied loans.  Gender in this model reverses direction, and men have 1.18 the odds of
women for mortgage loan denial.  Also, married couples are more likely than single
12
applicants to be denied home loans.  These findings suggest our hypothesis was
inaccurate, and this is discussed in greater detail in the next section.
Table 3
Model 3:  Denial by Gender, Race, Income and Marital Status
Variable                  b                                       Wald Chi-square           Odds Ratio      Confidence Limits
Gender                     -.1686                                 5.6865*                           .845                   .74 -   .97
Race                        1.0807                             329.2187*                         2.947                 2.62 - 3.31
Income                      .4580                             240.1510*                         1.579                 1.49 - 1.67
Marital Status          -.1987                                 9.8138*                           .820                   .72 -   .93
N=16,249
Model Chi-square:  692.319, df=4, p=.0001
*p<.05
     In order to test for the possibility of significant interactions between the independent
variables in the model, logistic regression models including interaction terms were tested.
Gender by marital status is significant in relation to the outcome variable (Table 4).
Exploring the interaction further revealed that marital status moderates the relationship
between gender and loan denial.  That is, married women who apply as primary
applicants are more likely than single women to be denied loans.  Marital status does not
play a significant role in loan denial for male applicants.  Our data suggest that secondary
applicants may be detrimental to married women in their loan application process.  It may
be that married women are being hurt by the credit ratings of male partners.  Given the
novelty of this finding, the need for replication in other data sets is suggested.
Model 4:  Denial by Gender, Race, Income, Marital Status and Gender x Marital
Variable                  b                                       Wald Chi-square           Odds Ratio      Confidence Limits
Gender                      .3467                                 5.8988*                          1.414                 1.07 - 1.87
Race                        1.0833                             330.0566*                          2.954                 2.63 - 3.32
Income                      .4545                             238.1508*                          1.575                 1.49 - 1.67
Marital Status          -.1060                                 2.5247                              .899                   .79 - 1.03
Gender x Marital     -.6476                               15.9562*                            .523                   .38 -   .72
N=16,249
Model Chi-square:  707.209, df=5, p=.0001
*p<.05
13
V. Discussion and Conclusions
     Our study indicates that, controlling for the variables thought most likely to impact
mortgage lending decisions, men are more likely than women to be denied home loans.
Because this finding is not what we had hypothesized, we have examined additional
empirical and theoretical explanations.  While not included in our predictive model, we
also examined whether neighborhood conditions or a loan amount to income ratio might
explain the finding.  These variables were not significantly related to denial.
     It is important to note that we must look cautiously at these findings because the
HMDA data have several limitations.  There are missing data, and a limited number of
explanatory variables. Because of this, and because of the counter intuitive nature of our
findings, our study raises more questions than it answers.
     Debt to income ratios, credit history, employment history, collateral and age have all
been suggested as explanatory variables which might explain the finding that men are
more likely to be denied loans, but such data are not available.  Shapiro (personal
communication, 1997) suggested that men have slightly worse credit histories than
women--this might be especially helpful for understanding the differential denial rates.
This raises a number of questions:  Is there empirical evidence that women have better
credit histories overall than men?  Do these credit ratings account for lending decision
differentials in our study?  Controlling for credit rating, is gender a factor in loan denial?
     Our finding that married women who are primary applicants may be more likely than
single women to be denied loans suggests that the household finances of this subgroup
should be further investigated and raises the question:  Are married women who are
primary applicants for home loans being hurt by negative credit ratings of male partners?
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One would assume that the additional income stream of a second adult would decrease
rather than increase the likelihood of denial.  The income and credit histories of these co-
applicants should be studied more carefully.
     If women are indeed more likely to receive home loans, why are there fewer single
female than single male homeowners?  The fact that single female applicants are not
more likely to be denied is fascinating in light of national census information that
suggests that this group is the least likely to own homes.  As noted earlier, 79% of
married couple households, 55% of male headed households, and 45% of female headed
households own their homes.  If mortgage market discrimination does not explain this
differential, we should examine why the 55% of female headed households who rent are
missing out on the social and economic benefits of  homeownership.  Could it be that the
single women applying for mortgage loans in our sample are not representative of the
general population of single women?  Are there other economic, social, psychological or
institutional barriers to homeownership in female headed households?
     Finally, are women being approved for loans in neighborhoods in which homes will
accumulate value?  It may be that women are applying for lower cost homes and are more
likely to apply for loans in minority and poor neighborhoods.  In our sample, 17% of
women applied for loans in poor neighborhoods and 9% of men applied for loans in poor
neighborhoods.  30% of women applied for loans in minority neighborhoods whereas
18% of men applied for loans in minority neighborhoods.  This suggests that women may
be investing in property that is less likely to accumulate equity and may also be getting
lower quality loans (i.e., those with higher interest rates) than are male applicants and
15
applicants in better neighborhoods (Smith, 1990).  Again, this calls for further research
into the specificity of loan application processes by women.
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Appendix A:  Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Gender Race Income Loan Amount Poor Nghbrhd Minority Nghbrhd
Gender 1.000
Race   .152* 1.000
Income   .314*   .225* 1.000
Loan Amount              -.198*              -.180*             -.562* 1.000
Poor   .100*   .289*   .271*              -.229* 1.000
Neighborhood
Minority   .123*   .514*   .218*              -.193*   .400* 1.000
Neighborhood
*p<.001
